The Road to MAGA: How U.S. Industrial and Trade Policy Gave Rise to Neofascism

Dawson Fishman

Introduction 

As the U.S. continues to experience growing wealth inequality and rising costs of living, the far-right has reemerged with significant strength. In 2024, the MAGA (Make America Great  Again) movement, centered around President Donald Trump, re-seized the levers of power; this time with their eyes set on vengeance for perceived wrongdoing by the Democratic Party with  

the election of President Joseph Biden in 2020. But how did we get here? Previously a manufacturing powerhouse, American factories have become hollow husks, testaments to a time  of a thriving middle class. Over the last 40 years, as America’s manufacturing base was  offshored, the neofascist elements of American politics grew in the shadows—evident in  Mahoning County, Ohio, a longtime Democratic stronghold that flipped to Trump in 2016. How,  then, has U.S. industrial and trade policies since the 1970s contributed to the rise of neofascism  and MAGA in American politics? 

What happened? 

1. Deindustrialization 

For decades, the U.S. has seen tremendous deindustrialization. Deindustrialization is the  process by which a nation’s industrial capacity, specifically in manufacturing, is reduced or  abandoned. This process of deindustrialization “is the result of a complicated set of factors  including globalization, offshoring, deregulation, downsizing and technological change that are  inherently interconnected” (Russo and Linkon 2009, 3). Through all these societal and economic  functions, deindustrialization has ransacked American manufacturing and contributed to right wing populism. Deindustrialization is not a natural shift, but rather “the direct result of decisions made by corporate and government leaders to pursue economic profit rather than the good of communities or the environment” (2009, 3).

Deindustrialization harms the working class and destroys communities. More than 32 million jobs were lost in the deindustrialization of the 70s and 80s (Russo and Linkon 2009, 4). Between 1995 and 2004, “almost 700,000 firms closed each year, affecting 6.1 million workers, and an additional 1.7 million firms contracted annually, affecting another 11.8 million workers” (2009, 4). These economic losses have a very high societal multiplier effect: 

Deindustrialization undermines the social fabric of communities, states and the nation. The social costs of deindustrialization include the loss of jobs, homes and health care; reductions in the tax base, which in turn lead to cuts in necessary public services like police and fire protection; increases in crime both immediately and longterm; decaying local landscapes; increases in suicide, drug and alcohol abuse, family violence and depression; declines in nonprofits and cultural resources; and loss of faith in institutions such as government, business, unions, churches and traditional political organizations. (2009, 4) 

When deindustrialization occurs due to government and corporate policy, entire communities pay  the price. 

But why would government leaders pursue an industrial strategy that harms their constituents? The answer lies in the neoliberal doctrine which is “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005, 2). According to neoliberals, the role of the state in the economy must be limited because it leads to inefficient allocation of resources. The result of these neoliberal reforms laid the foundation for what would follow—most notably China’s rapid economic development.

2. The China Shock 

This market fundamentalism has wreaked havoc on essentially all facets of American  manufacturing. In Fraying Fabric, Benton (2022) explores the decline of textile and apparel  manufacturing in the United States, which coincided with industrial decline in other industries.  Beginning in the 1970s, textile manufacturing in the U.S. began shifting its production to countries in the developing world. As textile imports grew, American industry failed to export its product (Benton 2022, 6). Benton states, “manufacturers increased production, hoping economies of scale could keep them competitive. But increased production could not keep pace with changing market demands or the lower labor costs experienced abroad” (2022, 6). This in turn led to widespread plant closures. Between January 1990 and February 2020, textile employment saw an 85.4% reduction, which ended all hopes of a strong American textile and apparel industry (2022, 1). The demise of the textile industry was further accelerated with China receiving Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR). 

The problems that grew to plague the domestic textile industry were also seen in other  important industries across America. Like the textile industry, those industries most vulnerable to  import competition are “subject to higher rates of plant exit” and larger reductions in  manufacturing employment (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson 2016, 221-226). “As manufacturing  continued its decline after the 1970s,” Benton explains, “the pursuit of trade deals continued to  outweigh workers’ concerns” (2022, 17). As China received PNTR, the number of U.S.  manufacturing jobs declined by 17% between 2001 and 2003 and China’s share of global  manufacturing exports grew from 2.3% in 1991 to 18.8% in 2013 (2022, 15; 2016, 6). The jobs lost in one manufacturing sector can also lead to downstream losses in other industries (2016). 

For example, declining textile manufacturing in the U.S. led to a decrease in domestic apparel manufacturing. Trends such as this led to the creation of the so-called “Rust Belt.” 

Industries most vulnerable to import competition also saw tremendous reductions in  employment. Job loss in industries vulnerable to trade shock creates long-term financial difficulties for workers, especially for those whose unemployment lasts longer than six months (Russo and Linkon 2009, 5). The trade shocks in America’s manufacturing labor market left many working class people in a terrible position. Having lost their jobs, wages, pensions, and other benefits, many Americans began to blame overclass elites and minorities for their financial situations. This opened the door for right-wing populists to exploit working class vulnerability for their own personal, financial, and political gain. 

3. Radicalization 

The Great Recession recovery left many Americans (especially working class whites) feeling neglected as economic stimulus was offered to banks and elites rather than homeowners and working people (Benton 2022, 19; Milonas 2024, 72; 77). With this sense of neglect and  decades of economic precarity, anger towards the elites, the system, and marginalized  communities mounted, leaving large swathes of America ripe for radicalization (2022, 17).¹ Thus  came the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Exploiting the racist and bigoted fears of many  Americans, Donald Trump was able to tap a certain rage in a segment of the working class who  have faced economic decline as their jobs have been shipped overseas, and their wages stagnated for decades (2022).  

¹It is important to note that this radicalization specifically grew out of the white working class. This situation of  economic precarity was already “historically faced by working class people of color who have faced extensive structural barriers to good jobs in even the best economies of the postwar period” (Benton 2022, 22).

Although Trump lost in 2020, the results of the election and COVID lockdowns further  radicalized an already angry white working class. Paired with rampant conspiracy theories, the  government bailouts for massive corporations and rising prices only further exacerbated wealth  inequality. As the country began to reopen, rapid inflation and high corporate profits drastically  raised costs of living throughout the country (Pancotti 2024). To shift blame, MAGA otherized  minorities. Many of these communities had already experienced decades of systemic economic,  social, and legal oppression. For them, the growing economic precarities being experienced by  the white working class were nothing new. 

The reactionary rhetoric and actions of MAGA have only grown more concerning nearly a decade after Trump’s first win. Today, civil liberties are being eroded, minorities and migrants are being baselessly detained and deported, and sweeping unconstitutional executive orders are  changing the very fabric of American law. We arrived here because the industrial and trade  policies of the U.S. government have pushed short-term profit seeking over long-term stability  and workers’ rights. 

Case Study: Mahoning County 

A story of self-reproducing decay 

One of the cities hit the hardest by deindustrialization was Youngstown, Ohio. According to Russo and Linkon, “Youngstown and the surrounding Mahoning Valley have faced a longterm  economic struggle, seen declines in population and tax base, and battled persistently high crime  rates, urban decay and questions about whether there just wasn't something wrong with the  community” (2009, 1). Much like other American industrial centers, deindustrialization  exacerbated by the Chinese trade shock has devastated Youngstown. As the factories shut down, workers in the city lost their jobs, and with them, their wages, retirements, insurance, and other  benefits connected to employment. As the unemployed population grew, the city also lost tax revenue which forced them to cut social service budgets (2009, 7). Crime skyrocketed, further  deteriorating the once-thriving city.  

As city resources shifted to the essentials, fire and police, maintenance budgets were cut,  causing city infrastructure to decay. Streets began to deteriorate, and public landscaping filled  with trash (Russo and Linkon 2009, 8). This results in a “kind of ‘broken window syndrome’ in  which decay begets more decay” (2009, 8). As city infrastructure decayed and crime rose, small  businesses left or boarded up their windows which creates a “sense of abandonment” that deters  any new investment (2009, 8-9). This cycle of abandonment and deindustrialization has led to  population declines, which only further exacerbates Youngstown’s downward spiral (2009, 18).  With the failure of government to curb economic shocks, public confidence in institutions vanished. The stage was then set for President Trump to capitalize with his promise to crush the institutions and “drain the swamp.” 

Democratic stronghold no more 

The Democratic party of today is not the Democratic party of the post-war period. Today, the party earns more support from educated voters—the reverse being true before 1976 (Kuziemko, Longuet-Marx, Naidu 2023, 2-3; 22-25). This seemed to coincide with the end of the New Deal Democrats, who oversaw economic prosperity for decades after WWII. As the New Deal era came to an end, so did many of the Democratic party’s popular economic positions such as support for unions and a higher minimum wage (2023, 3; 9-10). In this realignment of economic policy, the Democrats also began to pursue free trade and other neoliberal free market ideas such as NAFTA.

This trade agreement was particularly hated in Youngstown. Paul Sracic, chair of the  Youngstown State University Department of Politics and International Relations explained, “There is nothing that’s seemed more evil in this valley than NAFTA…NAFTA is less popular than Osama bin Laden … And I think these people in this area were waiting for a candidate who would be their champion against free trade” (Kasler 2016). The political shift in Mahoning County seems to reflect this sentiment. Trump promised to end NAFTA and revitalize America’s manufacturing base, especially in the Rust Belt. The chair of the Mahoning County Democratic Party “knew Mahoning Valley would tip to Trump when Trump was blasting trade deals and Clinton had no defense – which made Trump like dirty water to a parched population” (Kasler  2016). 

Working class white people in Mahoning County gave Trump an astounding share of the  vote in 2016, 2020, and 2024 despite being one of Ohio’s Democratic strongholds for decades (see Table 1). The last time a Republican won the county before 2020 was President Nixon in  1972. The major political shifts of Mahoning County thus began in 2016 as ultra-nationalism and  far-right populism started becoming a normal facet of American politics. Despite losing in 2020,  Donald Trump finally flipped the county to the Republicans for the first time in almost 50 years. In 2024, Trump again improved his electoral performance in the county, this time winning by nearly 10%. The repeated shifts toward the far-right indicate that the white working class in Mahoning County has vested its confidence into a dangerous far-right demagogue after losing confidence in institutions and the Democratic Party. 

Neoliberalism’s final form? 

From neoliberalism to neofascism 

Neoliberalism as an ideology began taking hold throughout the Western world in the  1970s and demanded zero state intervention in the economy. Through non-intervention, the  invisible hand would supposedly push markets to reach equilibrium that resulted in the most  optimal social outcomes. This idealized view of neoliberalism is a fantasy. The ideology demands tremendous state power wielded at the behest of only capital—transforming it into neofascism, which I define as a modern far-right ideology borne out of late-stage capitalism that is characterized by ultranationalism, xenophobia, racial supremacy, and rejection of liberal  democracy. Cox and Skidmore-Hess (2022) explain, “the neofascism of the present has emerged  from a crisis of neoliberal capitalism, where the functions of the capitalist state have long been re-directed toward the imperatives of capitalist accumulation and away from large scale state  capacity, except in militarization and policing” (592).² Thus, the neoliberal state exercises  tremendous intervention power for capital and must enforce these relations on the rest of society  with a militarized police (Milonas 2024, 78). Thus, neoliberalism in practice is not “free market  fundamentalism,” but rather state intervention in the direct interests of capital—making the  ideology fundamentally different in practice than in theory.  

² Neofascism is fundamentally different from 1930s Hitlerian and Mussolini style fascism. Rather than constructing  a powerful state apparatus to protect domestic capital like the fascism of old, “neofascism operates within a  globalized capitalist system that aims to accelerate the ‘freedom’ of powerful capitalist interests to increase their  accumulation of societal assets by accelerating the stripping of public and regulatory functions from an already  weakened public capacity” (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 2022, 592).

Among the most important contradictions of neoliberalism is that “it deregulates business and yet regulates the poor” (Cox & Skidmore-Hess 2022, 598). This regulation of the poor comes not only in the form of law (such as banning tent cities for the homeless), but also coercive violence from the state. In the American case, the war on drugs and militarization of the police have been integral to upholding this contradiction of neoliberalism (2022, 598). 

Using militarized police forces, neoliberal states resort to systematized violence to protect  capital interests and push privatization. Harvey explains, “Faced with social movements that seek  collective interventions, therefore, the neoliberal state itself is forced to intervene, sometimes  repressively, thus denying the very freedoms it is supposed to uphold” (2005, 69). This is the part  that is most important for this discussion. Neoliberal regimes often enforce their doctrine through  violent state repression. While the U.S. had already begun its authoritarian turn with the birth of  neoliberal hegemony, a more sinister wing of free-market extremism began to take root within the Republican Party. For decades, the hyper individualism espoused by neoliberals began to shake the moral fabric of America’s conservatives. Neoliberalism produced, to neofascists, an “unbridled individualism” that emphasized “individual hopes, desires, anxieties, and fears; choices of lifestyle, and of sexual habits and orientation; modes of self-expression and behaviors towards others” (2005, 82). Order had to be restored in the face of this “chaos of individual interests.” The neofascists thus began to depict the nation as “besieged and threatened by enemies from within and without” (2005, 82-83).³ 

This is where we find ourselves today as “the results of eighty-plus years of trade policy,  decades of deindustrialization, working class frustration, and increasing income and wealth inequality made itself evident” with the election of Donald Trump first in 2016, and subsequently  in 2024 (Benton 2022, 21). Rather than blaming the billionaire oligarchs for decades of wealth  transfer from the working class to the rich, the modern Republican Party has tapped xenophobic,  racist, homophobic, and transphobic rhetoric to mobilize their radicalized base (Milonas 2024,  70-71). With the destruction of unions and labor organizing, neoliberalism has pushed a scattered and angry working class into the cold embrace of neofascism. 

³It is worthy to note that Harvey made these observations ten years before the manifestation of MAGA and twenty  years before President Trump’s bullish use of executive power in his second term.

What needs to be done. 

By refusing to engage in pro-worker industrial and trade policy, the U.S. government has left the working class to the wolves of capital. Right-wing populists such as Donald Trump, and by extension the capitalist class, thrive when the working class economically suffers. With the  collapse of American hegemony imminent and increasing global reliance on China, the  corporations need to find new markets. The last market left for them to devour is our public goods, which is why we have seen massive cuts in the federal workforce. Capitalism will fall to its own contradictions, but not before it pillages our society of its last non-market structures. As put brilliantly by Antonio Gramsci, “The old [world] is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (1971, 276). Thus, neofascism is the tool of self-preservation of a system built on unlimited accumulation of wealth on a planet with finite resources. The working class must seize on this moment to build community power when a federal government is committed to totalitarian consolidation. To do this, we must throw aside our petty differences, organize the workers, and engage in mutual aid. This is the most fundamental strategy to combat neofascist radicalism in the working class—showing each other that our problem is the ultra-rich, not our migrant neighbors. 

Works Cited 

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